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Speaking at Yale Law School in 1938, Dean James Landis offered a
powerful defense of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, and in
particular its innovation of new federal administrative agencies. "The
administrative process," declared Landis, "is, in essence, our genera-
tion's answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative pro-
cess." Unlike generalist legislatures or formalist judges, administrative
agencies could address the complexities of the modern economy and in-
dustrial society by harnessing their expertise, professionalism, and inde-
pendence to serve the public interest. Not everyone shared Landis's
celebration of this new era of American state building. The eminent
Dean Roscoe Pound, then chair of an American Bar Association special
committee evaluating the rise of the New Deal administrative state, saw
the mixing of legislative, executive, and adjudicatory functions in agen-
cies like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - which
Landis himself designed and later chaired - as tantamount to "admin-
istrative absolutism."2
The debate between Landis and the New Dealers on the one hand,
and the old guard of legal scholars like Pound on the other, is by now a
familiar story in the origins of the modern administrative state.3 By the
time of Pound's report, the Supreme Court had already begun its recon-
ciliation with Roosevelt's New Deal following the 1937 "switch in
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1 JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938).
2 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 238
(1992) (describing the debate between Pound and New Deal supporters over the fear of "adminis-
trative absolutism"); see, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN.
REP. A.B.A. 331 (1938).
3 For a classic account of this debate, see, for example, HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 217-40




time."4  Over the ensuing decades, administrative law developed
through an ongoing series of debates and efforts aimed at legitimating
administrative authority, whether through the formalization of proce-
dures in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, the emphasis
on norms of agency expertise, or the rise of presidential oversight.5
Today, we are in the midst of another moment challenging the
legitimacy and viability of the modern administrative state, what Pro-
fessor Gillian Metzger recently termed in these pages as "anti-
administrativism," encompassing political and rhetorical attacks on the
legitimacy of administrative agencies, proposed legislation to restrict
agency rulemaking authorities, and growing constitutional skepticism
among some jurists about the scope of agency authority.6 This admin-
istrative skepticism, though, is not just a matter of deregulation; rather,
it manifests in two seemingly opposing but related trends. First, it man-
ifests in the efforts to privatize and dismantle the administrative state.
Several of the Trump Administration's most vocal supporters have vo-
ciferously called for the "deconstruction" of the administrative state.
The new Administration has in its first year made good on attempts to
gut the budget and staff of key agencies and implement regulations that
would privatize and undo many regulatory initiatives.7 Nor is this work
limited to the Trump Administration, or even to conservative policy-
makers. Rather, waves of privatization and deregulation have gradually
4 See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine? 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69 (2010).
See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1-940 (2014); HORWITZ, supra note 2; Reuel E. Schiller, The
Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, io6
MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the I3as: The Supreme Court's
Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 6o DUKE L.J. 1565 (2011). For a recent overview of
the different types of administrative-legitimizing theories - particularly, by appeal to expertise,
procedure, and presidential control - see, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Bureaucracy and
Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2017).
6 Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 20I6 Term - Foreword: 193os Redux: The Adminis-
trative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. I (2017); id. at 4.
See, e.g., Max Bergmann, Present at the Destruction: How Rex Tillerson Is Wrecking the
State Department, POLITICO MAG. (June 29, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magzine/story/2o17/
06/29/how-rex-tillerson-destroying-state-department-215319 [https://perma.cc/54 H8-ANC 3 ] (pro-
viding an account of Secretary Rex Tillerson's dismantling of the State Department and career civil
service); Talia Buford, What It's Like Inside the Trump Administration's Regulatory Rollback at the
EPA, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 18, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-trump-
regulatory-rollback-epa [https://perma.cc/AgXX-ETAL] (describing Administrator Scott Pruitt's
overturning of several major EPA programs and divisions); Gregory Krieg, What the "Deconstruc-
tion of the Administrative" State Really Looks Like, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:47 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2oI 7/03/30/politics/trump-bannon-administrative-state/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DVR3-BBEZ]; Alec MacGillis, Is Anybody Home at HUD?, PROPUBLICA (Aug.
22, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/is-anybody-home-at-hud-secretary-ben-
carson [https://perma.cc/KQD5-BCQg] (describing budget cuts and reductions to major Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development programs).
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dismantled Landis's administrative state over the past several decades,
spanning not only the more brazen efforts of the current Administration,
but running through the attempts of Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations in recent decades to make bureaucracy leaner, smarter,
and more market-friendly.8
Second, this regulatory skepticism has also animated a parallel, and
inverse, effort to centralize greater governmental control in the hands of
the President. This too is largely a bipartisan trend. Executives from
both parties - from Presidents Clinton to Bush to Obama to Trump -
have centralized presidential oversight of regulatory agencies. And
legal scholars and Justices from across the political spectrum have ap-
pealed to presidential control as a key mode of legitimizing and holding
accountable agency action.9 This concentration of control has similarly
sparked opposition. In the latter years of the Obama Administration,
critics challenged the expansive use of regulatory powers to advance
economic, environmental, and social policy goals, from workers' rights
to climate change to immigration reform.10  The young Trump
Administration has provoked even more extreme forms of these con-
cerns about expansive use of executive regulatory discretion. Its irreg-
ular assertions of executive power in areas like immigration and national
security seem to override informal conventions of internal processes of
expert consultation, civil service independence, and internal checks and
balances. The result has been the generation of significant concern
about the violation of internal norms and practices of reasoned executive
judgment," and which in turn has generated bureaucratic "resistance
from below."12
In his new book, Constitutional Coup: Privatization's Threat to the
American Republic, UCLA School of Law Professor Jon Michaels takes
on both of these challenges. This book represents the culmination
of a series of important articles, developed well before the current
8 See infra Part I, pp. 1676-81.
9 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); see also
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495-96 (2010) (writing for
the court, Chief Justice Roberts described the importance of presidential oversight of administrative
agencies).
10 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power,
Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2Q16), https://nyti.ms/2jAytGL
[https://perma.cc/YVY6-gBNP] (describing the Obama Administration's use of regulatory authority
to enact major social policies).
11 For an excellent discussion of the informal norms shaping executive judgment, see Daphna
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
12 For a recent exploration of this concept in context of the controversies of the Trump
Administration, see, for example, Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-
below-by-jennifer-nou/ [https://perma.cc/Q49Q-5YR2] (describing tactics that bureaucrats can em-
ploy in resisting presidential directives).
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Administration.1 3 Michaels explores the rise of the administrative state
and its constitutional and legal structure balancing expertise, participa-
tion, and presidential oversight. He traces the ways in which the effort
to eliminate its purported failures and frictions drives the efforts to pri-
vatize, dismantle, and marketize bureaucracy on the one hand, or to
centralize it in a unitary Executive on the other. Michaels's book is not
so much a celebration of the administrative state as it is an impassioned
defense of administration as a central pillar of our modern constitutional
structure that is increasingly under threat. For Michaels, the adminis-
trative state is not the bogeyman of "big government"; nor is it the spec-
ter of inefficiency and gridlock that privatization's proponents make it
out to be. Rather, it is the modern instantiation of the central principles
of our constitutional order. Like the classic republican constitutional
design that saw the separation of powers as a key to securing individual
liberty and assuring effective and capable government, the modern-day
institutions of administrative agencies and administrative law, for
Michaels, secure those foundational values for the modern era.14
Michaels's book follows in the tradition of Landis - and in some ways,
even Pound - to not only defend the idea of the administrative state
and its importance to modern government, but also to help reimagine
the ways in which our core commitment to constitutional separation of
powers and checks and balances can be maintained and even deepened
into the twenty-first century. Thus, even as he defuses the critiques of
regulation fueling the push to privatize or centralize, Michaels offers a
way forward for a third type of regulatory critique: accepting the need
for greater procedural checks and balances around regulatory authority,
engaging that critique, and offering a constructive way forward by re-
inventing the regulatory process itself.
Michaels has written a wide-ranging and in many ways prescient
book that anticipates today's central debates: about the scope of admin-
istrative and executive power in a constitutional republic; the tensions
between public and private, state and market, in an era of economic
inequality and upheaval; and the dangers of overriding the procedures,
norms, and softer conventions governing administrative action.
Michaels rightly argues that dismantling the administrative state risks
creating more aggrandized and unchecked executive power, not less.
But the stakes are even larger than Michaels's already expansive for-
mulation. For it is also true that without an administrative state, other
forms of social and economic power would similarly find themselves
13 See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account
of the Old and New Separation of Powers, gi N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2o6); Jon D. Michaels, An En-
during, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015); Jon D. Michaels, Privat-
ization's Progeny, ioi GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013).
14 For a classic, well-known example of this republican constitutionalism seeking restrained
but effective government secured through the constitutional separation of powers, see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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unrestrained. In a world without labor regulation, restraints on corpo-
rate concentration, or consumer protections, economic inequalities are
magnified; without nondiscrimination regimes enforced and adapted by
regulation, gender and racial hierarchies are harder to contest. Despite
its neutral trappings in legal doctrine and thought, the administrative
state is not ultimately a neutral institutional structure. Its origins are
rooted in the attempt to grapple with the upheavals and inequalities of
the industrializing economy. Similarly, its dismantling reflects not just
legalistic and political critique, but also a systematic effort to shift the
balance of social, political, and economic power.
The attacks on the administrative state that Michaels diagnoses -
and the solutions he proposes - must be read in context of the purposes
to which regulation is deployed as well as the purposes that animate
attempts to dismantle regulation. It is these substantive implications of
administrative power that raise the stakes of the debates about admin-
istrative law and agency authority - and which explain the increasingly
scorched-earth politics and tactics undermining administrative legiti-
macy in recent years.15 To the extent that critiques of administrative
authority still gain purchase independent of these substantive disagree-
ments about the purposes of regulation, there is a real concern that such
administrative authority be subjected to checks and balances assuring
accountability, legitimacy, and nonarbitrariness. Michaels shares much
of this concern, but rather than addressing it by eliminating the modern
regulatory state altogether, he rightly suggests we would be better served
by expanding the internal checks and balances that legitimate, appro-
priately structure, and constrain the exercise of regulatory authority.
These checks and balances are thus important not only in their own
right to make good on core constitutional principles of checking govern-
mental power; they are also important to preserving the deeper mission
of regulation, addressing substantive challenges of systemic economic
and social inequality and exclusion. To put it another way, given the
substantive stakes and wide-ranging authority of modern regulatory
agencies, the existing processes and institutional structures (for example,
of conventional notice-and-comment procedures) are simply unable to
bear the moral justificatory and legitimizing weight of the modern reg-
ulatory state. But rather than abandoning the regulatory state, Michaels
offers us a way forward that would reconstruct the administrative pro-
cess for the modern era.
This Review engages Michaels's important work, situating it in con-
text of these wider economic and social battles to sketch a broader claim.
The defense of the administrative state, this Review argues, is not just
about assuring checks and balances; it is about preserving democracy -
15 For a discussion of these growing controversies over the administrative state, see, for example,
Metzger, supra note 6. For examples of how the administrative state is in the frontlines of the policy
fights of the Trump era, see sources cited supra note 7.
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the idea that, through political institutions, we the people expand our
capabilities and capacities to remake social and economic systems that
are otherwise beyond the scope of individuals, associations, or ordinary
common law. It is also about democracy in its substantive connotation:
through the administrative state, we make possible the realization of
substantive democratic values of equality and inclusion. Landis was
right in a sense: administration is a response to the failures of ordinary
judicial or legislative policymaking, but the value of administration lies
not in its insulated expertise but rather in the degree to which it succeeds
in creating the tools and processes for democratic contestation of back-
ground social and economic inequalities.16
The rest of this Review proceeds as follows. Part I provides a sum-
mary of Michaels's main contributions in Constitutional Coup. Part II
situates Michaels's critique in context of broader substantive implica-
tions of both the privatization and the centralization challenges to the
administrative process. Part III then turns to the question of democratic
accountability. The importance of - and pitched political battles
around - the substantive purposes of the administrative state under-
score how critical it is to defend and reinvent a set of institutional struc-
tures and procedures through which such regulatory authority, and dis-
agreements over it, can be exercised. Indeed, much of the critique of
expansive regulatory authority stems from a concern about the account-
ability and responsiveness of administration. Michaels shares some of
this concern (as do I). But rather than addressing this concern through
either privatization or centralization, Michaels rightly points us in a dif-
ferent direction: the need to more thoroughly democratize administra-
tive authority. Part IV concludes by connecting the stakes of these de-
bates over administrative authority to broader concerns about
democracy and inequality.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
DANGERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECONSTRUCTION
Michaels's work is admirably expansive, resting on a deep concep-
tual core that generates a number of implications for debates in legal
scholarship and for incredibly timely legal and policy questions about
the future of administrative governance in an era marked by the puz-
zling combination of deregulation and expansive executive overreach.
Michaels's argument involves several central elements.
16 For a normative defense of administration as a democratic forum, see my other
works, particularly K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 86-96,
142-46 (2017); and K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10-28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3039733
[https://perma.cc/L77A-LZ 5C].
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First, though privatization as a term appears in the subtitle of the
book, it is somewhat misleading, for Michaels develops a broad under-
standing of privatization itself. The contemporary battles over the ad-
ministrative state, in Michaels's telling, are the predictable outcomes of
the decades-long loss of faith in the vision of the Rooseveltian New Deal
state, giving way to President Reagan's conservative revolution in the
1980s and the larger pattern of privatization, deregulation, and the dis-
mantling of the core practices and institutional dynamics that define
administrative institutions. Privatization involves more than simply
contracting out public services to private providers. It includes "gov-
ernment reliance on private actors to carry out State responsibilities;
government utilization of private tools or pathways to carry out State
responsibilities; or government 'marketization' of the bureaucracy, con-
verting civil servants into effectively privatized, commercialized ver-
sions of their former selves and relying on them to carry out State re-
sponsibilities" (p. To6). Practices of "deep service contracting" like the
outsourcing of military functions to private security forces or the private
operation of prisons remain as the most visible and well-known exam-
ples of privatization and its threat to norms of transparency, account-
ability, and public oversight (pp. 111-14). But for Michaels, privatiza-
tion as an ethos extends further, including everything from the displace-
ment of public policymaking by private standard setting; to the conver-
sion of independent, meritocratic civil service officers into at-will
employees like any other commercial enterprise; to the greater reliance
on crowdsourcing, philanthropy, and venture capital to drive public
projects (pp. To6- ii). Privatization is not just a policy regime but rather
a broad ethos that has "expanded, and even mutated in ways that defy
ready identification, analysis, and synthesis" (p. To6). This push to pri-
vatization has been furthered not only by Reaganites but also by liberals
in the Clinton Administration and beyond who have championed "the
wholesale privatization and commercialization of many key government
services and functions" (p. 102). The task of Michaels's book is to offer
a "philosophically ambitious and constitutionally resonant" vision of
government capable of responding to this powerful privatization ethos
(p. To6).
This broad view of privatization as ethos drives the second key in-
sight in Michaels's critique. Privatization is not a tale of a weak bu-
reaucracy giving way to greedy contractors profiting off the public fisc;
rather the dangers are more pernicious, often involving a clever state
that is aggrandizing its power by operating outside of the institutional-
ized checks and balances of the administrative process and, as a result,
concentrating power and immunizing itself from democratic contesta-
tion. As Michaels argues:
[T]his commingling of government and market forces enables the accretion
of State power at the expense of the private sector, threatening to destabilize
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the liberal democratic order. Further, this commingling enables the accre-
tion of political executive power at the expense of Congress and the civil
service, threatening the constitutional and administrative separations of
powers. (p. 126)
Indeed, this is where Michaels's passion and urgency shine through.
The real villain in Michaels's story is not a particular policy regime or
a specific system of outsourcing. Rather, it is the larger loss of faith in
the idea of government itself and the peddling of the fiction that the
privatization ethos perpetuates: that we can have both limited and pri-
vatized government on the one hand and constitutional government
marked by checks and balances on the other. The promise that public
goods and services can be provided privately and on the cheap is
"simultaneously indulging and deceiving the American public by disas-
sociating government goods and services from the government" (p. 2),
simply transferring rather than reducing governmental imperatives into
an even less scrutable, accountable, and effective system of private pro-
vision. This transference of authority and responsibility represents a
normative challenge to constitutional values because, for Michaels, "the
project of twentieth-century administrative governance [i]s a norma-
tively and constitutionally virtuous one" (p. 4).
The loss of checks and balances that accompanies the privatization
ethos is cast into sharp relief by Michaels's third central argument: that
the often-frustrating frictions and clashes of the administrative process
are in fact features and not bugs of the system - and more importantly,
they are features that embody our most foundational constitutional te-
nets of the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the diffusion
and accountability of concentrated power. This is what Michaels brands
as the pax administrativa, the development of a modern legal and insti-
tutional regime of administration that synthesized values of expertise,
political accountability, and participation (pp. 41-50).
Michaels recovers a prehistory of administration, noting that before
the rise of the New Deal state, administration and regulation were
very much still present, but riven by problems of corruption and illegit-
imacy spawned by the state's reliance on private actors. Privateers,
bounty hunters, and the spoils system of patronage marked this early
administrative era (pp. 24-29). But the rise of modern administrative
law changed this. Several late nineteenth-century statutes provided
greater independence, accountability, and structure to the administra-
tive process. The Anti-Pinkerton Act created protections against cor-
ruption by barring some private organizations from being deputized to
serve administrative and regulatory functions. The "salary revolution"1 7
established professional and secure pay for civil servants (pp. 32-33).
The Pendleton Act combined with subsequent statutory revisions
17 See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013).
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provided for meritocratic hiring, promotion, and tenure. These
measures helped establish not only the legal regime for an autonomous
and expert civil service, but also a culture of public service and profes-
sionalism (pp. 70-72). This formalization of the administrative process
took another major step with the passage of the APA in 1946, providing
uniform procedures for agency rulemaking and adjudication, participa-
tory mechanisms such as notice and comment, and routinized judicial
review of agency action. These are "superstatutes" (p. 7o), with quasi-
constitutional import" - not because they are objectively agreed upon
and entrenched (indeed Michaels's book is suffused with concern that
these systems are being actively dismantled) but because they have nor-
mative value in providing constitution-like checks and balances.1 9
This tripartite system of presidential appointment, independent civil
service, and civil society participation through notice-and-comment pro-
cedures comprises what Michaels defines as an "administrative separa-
tion of powers" (p. 59). Like the foundational constitutional separation
of powers, these three institutions provide "tools to guard against tyr-
anny" and "promote and enable democra[cy]" (p. 147). Furthermore,
they replicate the division of executive, legislative, and judicial functions
within the administrative state: appointed agency heads stand in for the
Executive; an independent civil service plays the role of neutral and
impartial adjudicator of agency actions; and civil society participation
provides input from the public akin to the democratic legislature
(pp. 59-62).
Precisely because of the importance of these internal checks and bal-
ances within the administrative state as a "last line of defense" against
state tyranny (p. 156), they have persisted despite the dominance of party
politics (p. 152). As Michaels notes, the clashes between appointed
agency heads, civil servants, and external civil society aren't "efficient
or orderly," but that is the point: they are "democratic, pluralistic, inclu-
sive, and deliberative" (p. 6), and represent a modern-day manifestation
of the classic separation of powers principles. This administrative sep-
aration of powers, and its importance to preventing arbitrary authority
and securing liberty, are why privatization is so deceptive and perni-
cious. As Michaels argues:
18 For a classic discussion of superstatutes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Essay,
Super-Statutes, 5o DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
19 For a useful critique of the superstatute concept, see Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, NEW
REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010a), https://newrepublic.com/article/78604/superstatutes [https://perma.cc/
6MNB-BYMQ]. Professor Adrian Vermeule notes that it is unclear how to identify a superstatute
in objective terms and that entrenchment in popular support or daily operations can lead
such diagnoses astray. Id. Michaels takes a more compelling, normatively driven approach, iden-
tifying those statutes that are central on his read to assuring constitutional values of checks and
balances in the administrative state and as a result identifies a different set of essential statutes than
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn in their discussion (pp. 70-71) (distinguishing his
approach from that of Eskridge and Ferejohn).
06792018]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
[G]overnment cannot and ought not be run like a business in any meaning-
ful sense of the term. . . . [W]e must remember that government and busi-
nesses have very different powers and responsibilities; that government and
businesses answer to very different constituencies; and that these differences
in powers, responsibilities, and constituencies make good, practical sense,
are normatively desirable, and are mutually reinforcing....
Until that message is heard, until government's intrinsic, albeit idiosyn-
cratic, worth is recognized on its own terms, American public administra-
tion will continue to look inadequate . . . . (p. 23I)
Fourth, Michaels's concept of the administrative separation of pow-
ers generates several implications for legal scholarship and current de-
bates. Within administrative law scholarship, the concept of an admin-
istrative separation of powers continues a growing trend among scholars
to look inside the "black box" of administrative agencies and unpack the
internal dynamics of agency action.2 0 It also provides a way to reconcile
ongoing debates about the nature and legitimacy of the administrative
state. In Michaels's account, the point of administrative law is not to
choose between presidential oversight, participation, or expertise, but
rather to assure the tripartite checks and balances between all three of
these approaches (p. 65). This concept of the administrative separation
of powers fuses several different theories of administrative legitimacy;
rather than continuing debates between, say, presidentialist, techno-
cratic, or participatory theories of administration, Michaels engages all
three in his model of administrative institutions, incorporating a "plu-
ralism of values" to appropriately constrain and channel the exercise of
administrative authority.2 1 Indeed, this internal system of checks and
balances provides Michaels with a rejoinder to calls for a more unitary,
presidentialist executive branch.2 2
As a legal and policy matter, this commitment to an administrative
separation of powers suggests a need to "insource" more governmental
functions back into public institutions that can operate with such checks
and balances in place (p. 13). It also suggests a very different approach
to judicial and legislative oversight of the administrative state. For
Michaels, judicial review should shift to a kind of process-based theory
aimed at reinforcing these internal administrative checks and balances
(p. 184). The legislature must help rebuild an independent, salaried, and
well-trained civil service by, for example, expanding salaries and sup-
porting leadership development and training within agencies (pp. 213-
14). Civil society must also have greater ability to participate through
more effective notice-and-comment systems (pp. 218-19).
20 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013);
Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
21 See Vermeule, supra note 5, at 2464 (emphasis omitted) (noting the pluralism of values ani-
mating three major "camps" of administrative law theory, from presidential administration, to ex-
pertise, to proceduralism, id. at 2463-64).
22 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010).
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These arguments open up a wide range of broader implications,
which the following Parts of this Review will explore. First, if privati-
zation is best understood as an attempt to bypass the institutional checks
and balances of the administrative state, as Michaels suggests, then the
dangers of privatization manifest not just in terms of the violence it does
to the procedural values of constitutional checks and balances. In by-
passing or dismantling the administrative state, the privatization ethos
has distinctive substantive valence as well, magnifying structural dis-
parities of economic inequality, political power, and social, racial, and
gender subordination. Second, Michaels's account anticipates much of
the conflagrations of the Trump era. Michaels rightly views the Trump
Administration as the "apotheosis" of the ethos of "politicized business"
(pp. 13-14),23 seeking to dismantle and bypass the administrative sepa-
ration of powers through privatization and deregulation on the one
hand, and overbearing politicized control from above on the other. But
the realities of our larger political structures at this point suggest that
the problems Michaels diagnoses are likely to persist even beyond the
Trump era, particularly given the configuration of interest-group politics
animating the current attacks on the administrative state. Third, given
the substantive implications of anti-administrativism, and given the
likelihood of exacerbating pressures on the administrative process, what
are the prospects for rescuing and reconstructing the modern adminis-
trative state? Following Michaels, I argue here that administration can
be reworked to better encourage the kinds of internal checks and bal-
ances that can legitimate and appropriately restrain and guide the exer-
cise of administrative authority. But I suspect that we will need a more
far-ranging structural reformation of democratic checks and balances,
both in the administrative process and in our larger democratic infra-
structure.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE VALENCE OF ANTI-ADMINISTRATIVISM
Michaels pulls no punches in his rebuttal to the privatization ethos
and in emphasizing the importance of rescuing the administrative state
from corrosion. But even so, there is a way in which Michaels's articu-
lation of the problem of privatization and the value of public admin-
istration understates both. Michaels centers the "clunkiness" (p. 77) of
the administrative separation of powers as the reason administrative
agencies are attacked both by those fearing "big government" and by
those frustrated by governmental inefficiency:
On the one hand, the administrative state is attacked by those who do
not look past the initial and admittedly disconcerting consolidation of ad-
ministrative power. And, on the other hand, the administrative state is crit-
23 Emphasis has been omitted.
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icized by privatization hawks who seemingly recognize latter-day adminis-
trative fragmentation and bristle at the inefficiencies associated with a dis-
aggregated architecture to which they assign no constitutional significance.
(P. 58)
But even if we appreciate the constitutional importance of the ad-
ministrative separation of powers, that still doesn't answer the prior
question of why we need the regulatory state in the first place. The
regulatory state's origins and value are inextricably tied to substantive
debates, not just procedural ones, about economic inequality and social
exclusion. Many defenses of administration have long noted the im-
portance of regulation to producing greater social welfare, efficiency,
and equality, despite the centrality of procedural and institutional con-
cerns in administrative law discourse.2 4 Michaels references the recur-
ring problem of economic crisis and inequality as spurring regulation (p.
31). Thus, administrative checks and balances ensure that the powers
of the regulatory state are deployed in ways consistent with values of
liberty and democracy, but these substantive ambitions for equality and
inclusion are fundamentally why we need a powerful central regulatory
apparatus in the first place.
Bringing these substantive dimensions of administration to the fore
in turn helps clarify why the politics of anti-administrativism (as distinct
from the intellectual and scholarly manifestations of long-running de-
bates over administrative power) can often be so brazen - and why
critiques of administration seem to persist despite good-faith efforts of
many regulatory reforms to defuse those criticisms by seeking ever more
streamlined and efficient regulatory processes. Privatization and cen-
tralization, the two threats to the administrative process that Michaels
identifies, are not just driven by an inability to appreciate the value of
checks and balances and their accompanying inefficiencies. These
threats are also driven by deep substantive disagreements with the core
purposes of administration - and a conviction that by dismantling (or
centralizing control over) administrative agencies, we might even pre-
clude certain kinds of substantive debates from arising.2 5
A. Privatization and the Challenge
of Contesting Economic and Social Structure
The regulatory state did not simply come into being because of the
complexity of modern governance; rather, in its key moments of institu-
tional innovation and development, the rise of modern administration
has always been closely tied to substantive aspirations to counteract in-
equalities, hierarchies, and disparities of power generated by a changing
24 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 9
(2012).
25 See infra section IIC, pp. 1691-97.
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social and economic order. As Michaels writes, the socioeconomic up-
heavals of industrialization led an "increasingly inclusive and mobilized
public" to demand "greater protection from the vagaries, deceptions, and
dangers of the marketplace" (p. 41). As a result, a "State newly tasked
with these weighty and extensive responsibilities (and newly attuned to
the disciplining effects of a more demanding, empowered, and diverse
electorate) could no longer get away with being small or amateurish"
(p. 41). The outcome of these demands was a burst of institutional in-
novation and state formation that created the explosion of new admin-
istrative bodies, commissions, and bureaucrats in the Progressive Era,
accelerating with President Roosevelt's New Deal. While Michaels is
certainly right to highlight the ways in which the professionalization and
proceduralization of these new administrative powers were central to
their legitimation, the rise of the modern regulatory state - and its po-
litical and normative valence - has to be understood in context of these
substantive aspirations and concerns arising from the industrial econ-
omy.
The upheavals of industrialization generated more than simple
economic dislocation; they provoked a deep political crisis.26 Late
nineteenth-century thinkers, lawyers, and reformers saw industrial cap-
italism as a fundamental threat to existing institutions and political ide-
als. Industrialization produced widespread immiseration, dislocation,
and precarity.27 But it also produced very clear and threatening new
forms of economic power: the power of managers over workers and the
rise of new corporate titans like J.P. Morgan, the Vanderbilts, and the
Rockefellers, whose corporate control over finance, rail, oil, and other
foundational goods and services placed whole towns and business sec-
tors at their mercy.28 At the same time, political institutions themselves
were already viewed as captured, corrupt, or otherwise incapable of
meeting these challenges: legislative corruption was a widespread con-
cern, and a conservative judiciary posed a threat to basic state police
powers aimed at protecting workers, health, and safety - and curbing
these new forms of corporate power.29 This context generated social
movements across the country, from the Farmers' Alliance (which would
become the widespread Populist movement), to the largely urban,
middle-class Progressive movement, to the growing organized labor
movement.3 0
26 For a longer version of this interpretation of late nineteenth-century reform and its links to
the origins of the modern regulatory state, see, for example, RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 54-96.
27 See id. at 55-56.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 79.
3o See id. at 57-58.
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While these movements were themselves highly diverse and hetero-
geneous in their members and demands, they shared a common set of
ideas: that the industrial economy was a highly unequal one shaped by
new forms of domination and power, and that for economic and political
liberty to survive industrialization, new institutions would have to be
created to empower the public and check the excesses of industrializa-
tion. First, the problem of industrial capitalism was not just one of
income inequality or maldistribution. More critically, it was a problem
of economic power.31  For antitrusters and crusaders like Louis
Brandeis, a key problem was that a variety of private actors, from mo-
nopolies and trusts, to finance, to corporations more broadly, had accu-
mulated a degree of quasi-sovereign control over the economic vitality
and well-being of individuals and communities - yet were not subject
to the kinds of checks and balances and norms of public justification
that would have accompanied equivalent exercises of public power.32
This problem of economic power also appeared in Progressive Era cri-
tiques of the market system itself. On this view, as thinkers like Robert
Hale and John Dewey suggested, what might appear as impersonal
"market forces" that, for example, drove wages down or prices up, were
in fact the cumulative result of thousands of microscale transactions and
bargains, each of which took place under (legally determined) disparities
of power. Law constructed markets - and thus shaped market forces
themselves.3 3
Second, if the problem of capitalism was really a problem of power,
then the remedy required the construction of new forms of civic capacity
empowered to contest such private and market power. Thus, for
Progressive Era reformers, a key challenge was the challenge of action-
ability.3 4 As Dewey put it in his influential book, The Public and Its
Problems, the problem of the modern public was that it was too scat-
tered, diffuse, and disorganized, incapable of asserting its interests in the
face of the pressures of the industrial economy.3 5 By its very nature,
economic inequality in an industrializing economy could not be coun-
teracted at an individual level; the background disparities of power were
systemic and could be altered only by equally systemic changes to the
background rules of the marketplace itself. Indeed, this was one of the
central insights of legal realist scholars and progressive economists like
John Commons, Robert Hale, Richard Ely, and others, who saw the
1 See id. at 66.
32 See id. at 65 n.52, 77.
33 See id. at 66.
34 See id. at 86-88.
35 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 126-27, 129-42 (Swallow Press 1954)
(1927).
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prospects for economic equity as requiring expansive efforts to restruc-
ture the background rules of the market itself.3 6 By creating new insti-
tutions like regulatory bodies, reformers made it more possible to act on
these seemingly powerful and diffuse forces; by situating these bodies in
a larger context of public-oriented, democratic politics, these agencies
could fairly be seen as agents of the public good. Thus, private power
would be made contestable and governable by democracy.37
These are the kinds of aspirations that fueled the experimentation
with the expansion of the administrative state: starting at the state and
local level with the efforts by cities to municipalize private utility com-
panies and by state governments to create railroad oversight commis-
sions and agencies to address labor, poverty, and public health, and then
reaching the federal level as the Progressive Era Administrations of
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson began to experi-
ment with antitrust and economic regulatory oversight.38 As Professor
William Novak has convincingly argued, this proliferation of state and
local regulatory experiments shaped a generation of legal scholars and
policymakers, giving rise to the modern techniques of administrative
governance and making the later New Deal creation of the modern ad-
ministrative state possible.3 9 The rise of administration, then, was in-
extricably related to the rise of democracy, in two related senses: first,
the building of state regulatory capacity provided the democratic public
as a whole with new tools through which to make a vision of socioeco-
nomic order possible; second, these tools were at the outset oriented, at
least in part, toward a substantive vision of democratic accountability
and equality, not just of governmental actors, but perhaps even more
importantly, of private economic actors whose unchecked private and
market power posed a threat to democratic opportunity.
This relationship between democratic political agency and capacity,
substantive ideals of democratic equality, and the administrative state
also animated important episodes of regulatory institutional develop-
ment and innovation in the mid- and late twentieth century. As the
growing literature on "administrative constitutionalism" suggests, the
frontline battles for economic, racial, and gender equality often involved
the building and deploying of bureaucratic capacity, and internal battles
36 See RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 83-86.
37 See id. at 70-75.
38 See id.
3 William Novak's work in recovering the historical public utility tradition is of central im-
portance here. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, A NEW DEMOCRACY: LAW AND THE CREATION
OF THE MODERN STATE (forthcoming); William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Ori-
gins of Modern Business Regulation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139 (Na-
omi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017); William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control
of American Capitalism, 6o EMORY L. 377 (201-0).
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between social movements and bureaucrats.40 It was through the crea-
tion of regulatory institutions that labor rights, nondiscrimination pro-
tections, and access to federal welfare programs from Medicare to pov-
erty assistance were made possible. Furthermore, it was through the
pressures exerted on these bureaucracies by social movements that these
regulatory tools were gradually repurposed toward enforcing and imple-
menting equity- and inclusion-enhancing programs.
Consider, for example, Professor Karen Tani's recent work on the
administration of welfare rights. As Tani documents, the development
of a modern welfare rights regime involved a hard-fought shift away
from a view of welfare as charitable support for the needy to welfare as
a right that was an entitlement owed to members of the polity.4 1 This
shift had to be negotiated and was driven in large part by bureaucrats
within the Social Security Administration, who asserted their specific
vision of welfare as entitlement over the resistance of local welfare sys-
tem administrators. To make the idea of welfare rights a reality, these
bureaucrats experimented with implementing greater process protec-
tions for claimants.42 These federal officers also developed new ap-
proaches to training and hiring bureaucrats, socializing them into a way
of doing their day-to-day work that took as an axiom this more robust
commitment to welfare as entitlement.43 The success or failure of this
effort turned not so much on the role of judicial interpretations of con-
stitutional doctrine or presidential directives, but rather on more bu-
reaucratic concerns: jurisdictional turf battles between local and state
administrators more hostile to expanded welfare benefits and federal
agencies seeking to expand access, difficulties of sourcing enough trained
personnel who shared this larger mission, and the like. 4 4
A similar story can be told about the construction of equal access to
Medicare. As Professor David Smith details in his historical account, it
was the politics of regulation that constructed the reality of equal access
40 See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and
the Workplace, ig6oto the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (210) (describing different agencies' varying
interpretations and implementations of equal protection); Metzger, supra note 20 (defining the term
"administrative constitutionalism," id. at 1897-98, and reviewing the emerging historical literature
documenting the ways in which agencies interpret constitutional terms in their internal policymak-
ing deliberations, id. at 1903-09); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights
as a Language of the State, 122 YALE LJ. 314 (2012) (tracing the use of rights language in imple-
mentation of public benefits programs to the New Deal era and noting the use of administration to
drive economic equality).
41 Tani, supra note 40.
42 Id. at 343-44.
43 Id. at 356-68.
44 Id. at 354-55.
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to Medicare as a universal entitlement.4 5 This outcome was neither ob-
vious, nor predetermined. Rather, it was the contingent result of a com-
plex interplay of bureaucratic innovation, social movement pressure,
and regulatory policymaking. As Smith argues, in the early days of
Medicare, there was a very real threat that the program would be ad-
ministered in racially discriminatory and exclusionary ways.46 The
health system emerging in the mid-twentieth century reflected the legacy
of racial exclusion and hierarchy in the Jim Crow South, marked by
segregated and geographically concentrated hospital systems, and
driving vastly divergent health outcomes and mortality rates between
whites and African Americans.47 Civil rights movement groups like
the NAACP, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Congress of Racial Equality,
made the integration of hospitals and the healthcare system a key focal
point - taking the lead from African American health professionals
who drove these campaigns.48 Pressure from civil rights leaders led to
a major shift in Department of Health, Education, and Welfare leader-
ship and culture. By December 1965, the agency issued a new internal
memo that declared its mission to include the compliance with and en-
forcement of civil rights goals, through the administering of Medicare
funding for hospital systems.49 The agency created an Office of Equal
Health Opportunity in February 1966 to enforce Title VI compliance for
any hospital receiving Medicare payments.5 0  This new office in turn
hired teams of investigators, coordinating with civil rights groups to
train them and to identify hospitals that might be violating civil rights
requirements.51
The rise of the administrative state was thus not a politically neutral
endeavor. The checks and balances that legitimate administrative au-
thority in essence make possible (but do not guarantee) the contestation
of deep forms of economic and social inequality, subordination, or hier-
archy. This is not to say that administrative authority is always equality
45 See DAVID BARTON SMITH, THE POWER TO HEAL: CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICARE, AND
THE STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2016); see also Vann R.
Newkirk II, The Fight for Health Care Has Always Been About Civil Rights, THE ATLANTIC (June
27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/201-7/06/the-fight-for-health-care-is-really-
all-about-civil-rights/531855/ [https://perma.cc/YFQ3-2RQC].
46 See SMITH, supra note 45, at 84-86, 128.
47 See id. at 18-23.
48 See id. at 25-29 ("If Medicare was the gift of the civil rights movement, it was in an exchange
for the critical gift a few unusual health professionals provided the civil rights movement: back-
bone." Id. at 29.).
49 Id. at 9g.
5o Id. at iog.
1 Id. at 105-10, 118.
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or inclusion promoting - hardly.5 2 But in a reality where background
economic, social, and historical conditions already encode structural dis-
parities of wealth, opportunity, power, and influence, eliminating regu-
latory agencies and tools that are potentially capable of addressing these
disparities (even if they are not always deployed in these ways) precludes
much of equality- or inclusion-promoting public policy from getting off
the ground in the first place. The dismantling of administrative institu-
tions, then, is similarly nonneutral. Scholars of the administrative pro-
cess have long warned of the dangers of special interest capture of reg-
ulatory agencies, which would cause administrative authority to be
redirected to serve some interests over others.53 But agencies can also
be captured and neutered through inaction - through what political
scientists call "drift," where highly resourced and sophisticated players
are able to produce substantive policy change simply by holding existing
rules in place in the face of changing external conditions.5 4 Dismantling
agencies altogether would be an even more extreme form of opposition
to these potential uses: rather than trying to capture or simply neuter
the agency, more radical efforts to deconstruct regulatory institutions cut
off the very possibility by eliminating the regulatory capacity itself, a
kind of complete and total capture through deconstruction.
This substantive valence of administrative power and its potential
deconstruction adds an important layer to Michaels's critique of privat-
ization. Michaels alludes to the ways in which privatization risks per-
manently dismantling institutional tools and capacities that are difficult
to rebuild. As Michaels warns, under privatization, "we will have hol-
lowed out the government sector to such an extent that we may well
lack the capacity, infrastructure, and know-how to reclaim that which
has increasingly been outsourced or marketized" (p. 12). He rightly
notes that privatization emerged as a "pivot[]" strategy in the Reagan
era, a "second-best" to dismantling regulatory bodies themselves (p. 97).
This is a problem in particular because "the Market, at least in its pure,
idealized state, is not democratic, deliberative, or juridical. . . . It is the
52 See infra section I.B, pp. i689-gi (discussing exclusionary exercises of administrative power);
see also, e.g., Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (document-
ing how federal education officials after Brown v. Board of Education but before the 1964 Civil
Rights Act continued to interpret their constitutional obligations after Brown narrowly, continuing
to fund segregated school systems). As Tani and Smith note in their studies, the deployment of
administrative tools to advance equality and racial inclusion depended on a combination of outside
movement pressure, internal bureaucratic entrepreneurship, and cultural or personnel change
within the agency. See Tani, supra note 40; SMITH, supra note 45.
5 See RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 40-43. For a classic account of regulatory capture theory,
see George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3 (1971).
For a more recent reassessment of regulatory capture theory and its implications and limits, see
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 365, 389-91 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds.,
2014).
54 See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker, Paul Pierson & Kathleen Thelen, Drift and Conversion: Hidden
Faces of Institutional Change (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n Meeting Paper, Aug. 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2303593 [https://perma.cc/EKS9-PZ97].
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world of Schumpeter and Coase, not Montesquieu or Madison" (p. 5).
Private corporate governance, meanwhile, cannot replicate the kinds
of checks and balances that the separation of powers principles require
(p. 164).
Dismantling administration and returning to private ordering is
therefore troubling for democracy in three senses. First, given prior
background structural patterns of exclusion and disparities of wealth,
power, and opportunity, a return to private economic and social ordering
is by definition a return to economic inequality, social hierarchy, and
exclusion. Second, the dynamics of market competition or of corporate
governance cannot replicate or replace public institutions of democracy
or of checks and balances. They operate fundamentally differently and
are not substitutes. Third, a dismantling of regulatory institutions re-
moves some of the most vital and effective mechanisms through which
we as a democratic public seek to contest and reshape these background
structural inequities and exclusions: without tools of general adminis-
trative policymaking and enforcement, these structural inequities are
harder to overcome and reshape.
B. Centralization and the Problem of Administrative Exclusion
Though privatization occupies top billing as the villain in Michaels's
book, his framework also highlights the problem of centralized control
of the administrative state in a "unitary executive" as an inverse to the
privatization ethos - another approach to bypassing the clunkiness of
the administrative process. Citing a well-developed literature in admin-
istrative law scholarship,5 5 Michaels warns that the unitary executive
approach concentrates too much power in the President and bypasses
the very moral and institutional value of the administrative separation
of powers and its institutions of internal checks and balances within the
executive branch (pp. 153-57). Here too Michaels's argument implies a
much broader critique of administration and its opponents. The unitary
executive is not just a theory of administrative legitimation. The prob-
lem of relatively consolidated, discretionary bureaucratic power is one
that already exists in several different domains, such as national security
and surveillance (p. 154). It also arguably describes other forms of bu-
reaucratic domination and exclusion, from poverty law to the overly
powerful and unchecked discretion of the criminal justice system. These
domains of state power eflect Michaels's second fear: the centralization
of executive authority in ways that bypass the kinds of checks and bal-
ances offered by the administrative separation of powers.
Michaels first takes issue with unitary executive theories of admin-
istrative law, which seek to streamline agency decisionmaking by teth-
ering regulatory bureaucrats more directly to the decisions of the elected
See, e.g., POSNER& VERMEULE, supra note 22; Kagan, supra note g.
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President. While presidential administration theories see this as pro-
moting faster and more accountable decisions, for Michaels this ap-
proach raises concerns. Specifically, taken to its logical extreme, a pres-
idential administration theory threatens to override other checks and
balances in the administrative process, like an independent civil service
and other structural constraints imposed by courts, or statutorily man-
dated procedures (p. 156). But Michaels also raises a concern not with
the President per se, but rather with the danger of a "unitary agency" -
an administrative body that might run roughshod over the need to en-
gage stakeholders in participation, imbuing its responsibilities with
overly political or ideological motivations, tainting the exercise of its
authority (pp. 69-70). Michaels rightly sees this kind of unchecked
agency authority as a real instance of special interest capture (p. 170).
For Michaels, this kind of unchecked administrative authority is indeed
a real problem - but it is a problem that arises from efforts to "ease or
erase" the checks and balances of the administrative separation of pow-
ers (p. 154), not from the dangers of administration per se.
This is an important insight, which extends to a number of areas of
contemporary state authority. Consider, for example, the critiques in
poverty law scholarship about the problem of "bureaucratic disentitle-
ment."5 6  For many individuals, even accessing entitlements like food
stamps, unemployment insurance, and other safety net protections is
fraught, requiring multiple trips to social services offices, extensive pa-
perwork, and often demeaning and arbitrary interviews.5 7 Some state
welfare agencies instead combine privatization with selective exercise of
administrative power to extract revenue rather than provide vital ser-
vices.58 This problem of arbitrary bureaucratic power stems arguably
from a lack of the kind of administrative checks and balances that
Michaels describes, prompting efforts to create more effective proce-
dural protections, expertise, or democratic accountability of welfare bu-
reaucracies.5 9 The problem of arbitrary administrative power is even
more pronounced in context of the carceral state, the criminal justice
56 For a classic statement of the problem, see Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in
Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 3 (1984).
5 See KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTH-
ING IN AMERICA 2-3, 170-71 (2015).
58 DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY (2016).
9 See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings
the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 13 (2005) (discussing how the 1996 welfare reform law
contributed to bureaucratic disentitlement, id. at 24-30, and assessing whether the pretermination
hearings required by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), provide meaningful protection against
bureaucratic disentitlement, Lens, supra, at 36-48).
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system, the immigration system, and the post-9/I'i surveillance appa-
ratus.60 In each of these areas too we see Michaels's perceptive warning
of how abandoning administrative checks and balances can in fact ag-
grandize executive power in action: the welfare system, criminal justice
system, immigration system, and surveillance state all involve toxic
combinations of private contracting and outsourcing with centralized
executive control, the result of which is an even more unchecked con-
centration of power.61
C. Anti-Administrativism's High and Low Politics -
And the Failures of Administrative Reform
Michaels is thus not unsympathetic to critiques of regulation and the
need for regulatory reform. But his account of the twin threats of pri-
vatization and centralization is important in part because it illuminates
the ways in which reform efforts, from both right and left, so often miss
the mark. The problem in the end is that the threats of unchecked
agency authority, and the value of attempts at reform, do not fully grap-
ple with the ways in which both privatization and centralization relate
to one another, and how they can at times fuse with and build on deeper,
and troubling, political motivations.
Much of our debate about "big government" continues to take place
in terms of critiques of governmental inefficiency, its "clunkiness"
as Michaels terms it (p. 77), and its purported threats to traditional
concepts of the rule of law. Call this the "high politics" of anti-
administrativism. It manifests in the renewed legal critiques of admin-
istrative authority and the attempts by judges and some members of
Congress to rein in patterns of delegation and deference to administra-
tive agencies.62
This high politics of anti-administrativism itself has historically em-
phasized the second of Michaels's concerns: the threat of unchecked ad-
ministrative authority.6 3  For some intellectual critics of administrative
authority, the problem is a fundamentally substantive one: one might,
60 For a powerful example of the lawlessness that communities of color experience under the
criminal justice system, see Monica C. Bell, Essay, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J 2054 (2017).
61 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 93-147 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (describing and analyzing cases of pri-
vatization of security, prison, and other critical governmental functions); David J. Kennedy, Due
Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998) (describing the privatization
of various aspects of the public benefit system and the difficulties of assuring due process rights in
a privatized context).
62 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 6, at 8-51.
63 See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 58-64 (describing the elements of Lochnerian laissez-




for example, take a thick view of negative liberty, opposed to govern-
mental regulation of most kinds. This background conception of free-
dom understood in narrow negative liberty terms as freedom from state
interference and as the positive freedom to contract on the open market
echoes more closely a direct challenge to the substantive purposes of
much of modern regulation, especially on those matters concerning eco-
nomic and social inequality. But for many contemporary critics of reg-
ulation, the emphasis is instead on the second set of concerns Michaels
raises. First, there is this skepticism of governmental authority as likely
to be captured, corrupt, fallible, or inefficient.64 Second, there is a cor-
responding background defense of markets as self-regulating, efficient,
and incorruptible.6 5  The impersonal system of the market provides
aggregate price signals that coordinate efficient economic behavior, and
is more efficient at allocating social product than fallible humans and
corruptible public policy. Taken together, these comparative institu-
tional critiques suggest that the best, safest response to the threat of
unchecked administrative authority is to prophylactically limit its scope,
deferring instead to the more responsive and self-correcting nature of
the market itself. These elements animated the high politics of anti-
administrativism in the Lochner era, where progressive legislation was
struck down as a violation of freedom of contract and as an example of
self-interested "class legislation," the original form of "capture theory."66
Late twentieth-century critics of regulation echo these same
Lochnerian moves.6 7 Public choice theory pioneered by social scientists
like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock advanced the proposition
that regulation would most likely be captured by organized special in-
terests, who would hijack these levers of state power for private gain,
and thus suggested that deregulation would be more likely to advance
the public welfare.68 At the same time, new academic accounts of the
market system suggested that markets were perfectly capable of regu-
lating themselves, whether through the efficient aggregation of infor-
mation in price mechanisms or through the shareholder revolution in
corporate governance enabling investors to direct - and implicitly, to
hold accountable - the powers of private firms toward the most eco-
nomically beneficial activities.69 These critiques accompanied the re-
vival of libertarian conceptions of freedom and skepticism of the state
64 Id. at 40-43 (summarizing the intellectual critiques of the regulatory state in the mid- and late
twentieth century).
65 Id.
66 On the class legislation interpretation of Lochner, see, for example, HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 86-oi (1993).
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popularized by thinkers and public intellectuals like Milton Friedman.0
In so doing, late twentieth-century critics of regulation effectively rebut-
ted the foundational arguments that Progressive- and New Deal-era re-
formers used to justify and motivate the rise of regulation: if economic
power was already checked by market forces, and if regulation was more
likely to be perverse in its effects, then what reason would there be in
the first place for risking the expansion of state regulatory power?
On its own, this critique of administration, foregrounding the prob-
lems of capture, accountability, and inefficiency, can be addressed to
some degree by reforms to administrative processes and institutions
themselves, seeking to make them more responsive, rational, delibera-
tive, or accountable. Indeed, this is where many defenders of the mod-
ern administrative state have concentrated their scholarly and policy
efforts. Michaels's own work suggests some important ways forward in
this regard, as discussed below.1
But this critique of administrative accountability (or lack thereof) is
not the whole story, for accompanying (and arguably driving) these high
politics is a very different "vernacular politics" of anti-administrativism.
This is the domain of organized business interests, of the "Southern
strategy" deploying subtextual racialized critiques of "big government"
increasingly associated with governmental support for racial minorities,
women, and other challenges to existing economic and social hierar-
chies.7 2 These appeals motivated the push to privatize government pro-
grams, as well as to impose more punitive (and arbitrary) forms of bu-
reaucratic disentitlement. Indeed, for much of the history of the welfare
state, policymakers have resorted to the trope of the "undeserving poor"
to justify the imposition of eligibility requirements and screening
measures that limit access to safety net programs.3  Such racially
charged attacks on beneficiaries as lazy or undeserving have been codi-
fied through state and local conditions on benefits. These political ap-
peals and movements have provided a critical reservoir of support for
the attack on modern administration.
The role of organized interests in driving the attack on the adminis-
trative state is critical and cannot be understated. As Michaels notes
briefly, these intellectual critiques were initially unconvincing until the
1970s, when wider distrust of government expanded uring the eco-
nomic downturn and the post-Watergate era (pp. 86-87). Around the
same time, business interests shifted their strategy from one of working
70 Id.
71 See infra Part III, pp. 1697-709.
72 See, e.g., EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 57, at 14-17.
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA'S ENDURING CON-
FRONTATION WITH POVERTY (2013).
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within the regulatory architecture of the New Deal to actively disman-
tling and attacking it (pp. 89-91i), backed by the influx of ideologically
driven funders like the Koch brothers, and incubating these ideas in
think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage
Foundation. This change within the business lobby writ large is key -
organized interests weaponized these intellectual critiques as part of a
larger campaign to dismantle the New Deal regulatory state.74
Importantly, a similar fusion of the high politics of intellectual and
legal anti-administrativism with organized political interests took place
not just on matters of economic and business regulation, but also on
dimensions of race, particularly in the aftermath of the civil rights move-
ment. Much of the privatization ethos that Michaels describes - the
move away from public oversight toward favoring market-friendly so-
lutions, an emphasis on decentralization, and a greater skepticism about
the welfare state - was in part motivated by a racialized distrust of
government increasingly seen not only as a threat to big business, but
also as a vehicle for racial equity and desegregation. The fusion of often
implicit resegregationist backlash and antigovernment rhetoric is appar-
ent in President Reagan's vilification of "welfare queens" and the in-
creasingly bipartisan efforts to impose tighter requirements on welfare
recipients and smaller budgets for safety net programs,7 5 as well as in
the pattern of localities seceding from larger (and racially diverse) metro
regions as an alternative to desegregation.7 6 This synergy between the
high politics of anti-administrativism and organized attacks from busi-
ness interests on the one hand, and tapping into racial backlash on the
other, continued and indeed worsened in the decades since the Reagan
Administration. Recent studies of the deregulatory right highlight ex-
actly these alliances between business interests, racial resentment, and
antigovernment conservatism.7 7
This substantive valence of anti-administrativism raises the stakes
of Michaels's critique. The power that is aggrandized by privatization
and centralization is not just that of executive branch officials seeking
to bypass administrative procedures. The bigger moral problem here is
how this combination of privatization and unchecked administrative
power together furthers the background disparities of economic, social,
74 There has been a burst of new historical scholarship tracing the rise of the business lobby and
its critique of the New Deal. See, e.g., ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION (2012); JACOB
S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA (2016); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS (2olo); KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS
(2009).
7 KATZ, supra note 73, at 194-202.
76 GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 170-217 (1999).
7 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE RE-
MAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM (2012).
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and political power between different constituencies in American poli-
tics. This results in a disproportionate impact hat is racialized, gen-
dered, and falls particularly hard on marginalized communities.
This is not to reduce the intellectual critiques of privatizers, libertar-
ians, or public choice theorists into mere cloaks for interest group poli-
tics. The high politics of normative and legalistic critique of regulation
will continue to play out in terms of concepts like the rule of law, effi-
ciency, capture, democratic theory, and the like. And as suggested above
and addressed in greater detail below,' there are very real concerns that
need to be addressed about the accountability and responsiveness of
modern administrative authority. But this alliance between high and
vernacular politics of anti-administrativism is critical to understanding
patterns in contemporary American politics.
First, this alliance explains the ways in which anti-administrativism's
political rhetoric is often selectively applied. Indeed, it is notable how in
the history of attacks on the administrative state, it is often groups like
workers (in Lochner and more recent attacks on unions) or racialized
and gendered minorities (the welfare queen again) that are singled out
as evidence of capture, while more subtle forms of business influence on
regulatory policy, ideas, culture, and personnel persist. It also explains
why both threats of privatization and expanded bureaucratic power to
exclude or coerce might coexist in the same political coalition. Viewed
philosophically, these are opposing techniques, one libertarian, and the
other statist. At the level of the high politics of anti-administrativism,
Michaels places privatization and centralization in the same frame as
two seemingly opposite policy regimes that share a dislike of the frictions
and frustrations of administrative checks and balances. Viewed from
the standpoint of the vernacular politics and the substantive implica-
tions of anti-administrativism, privatization and centralization are com-
plementary tools for advancing a shared purpose: preventing the deploy-
ing of state power to dismantle structural economic and social inequities.
The Trump Administration is arguably a prime example of the way
in which anti-administrativism is deployed selectively and irregularly
to further a substantive agenda hostile to social and economic inclu-
sion. Thus, the "deconstruction of the administrative state"9 has pro-
gressed rapidly in agencies like the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which predominantly focuses on goals of racial and eco-
nomic inclusion through its administering of urban development pro-
grams,0 while agencies like Immigration and Customs Enforcement -
8 See infra Part III, pp. 1697-709.
79 Krieg, supra note 7.
80 See, e.g., MacGillis, supra note 7.
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notorious for its overzealous harassment of immigrant communities1 -
have benefited from Trump Administration proposals to aggressively
expand their budgets, personnel, and authority.8 2 We see here exactly
the strategic use of privatization on the one hand and expanded execu-
tive power on the other, around a common agenda that has a distinc-
tively racialized, exclusionary ethos.
The fusion of high and low politics of anti-administrativism is im-
portant for a second critical reason: it is crucial to understanding exactly
why the attempts by modern-day defenders of regulation to defuse the
privatization critique have fallen so woefully short. Indeed, Michaels
rightly castigates the failed attempts by liberal administrations from
Clinton to Obama to address the privatization critiques by absorbing
the critique of big, clunky, inefficient government and seeking "smarter
or leaner" government to make regulation more transparent, efficient,
and market-friendly (p. 126). This liberal accommodation of anti-
administrativism rests on a tragic misdiagnosis of the nature of the at-
tack on administration itself. To the extent that anti-administrativism
is shaped by the high politics of the anticapture concern, these "good
governance" measures are plausible responses that seek to slim down
the footprint of government and streamline and rationalize regulatory
processes. But to the extent that anti-administrativism draws its politi-
cal potency from its fusion with business interests and racial backlash
rooted in a fundamental rejection of the substantive aspirations of eco-
nomic and social equality achieved through administrative tools and re-
gimes, such good governance reforms are entirely beside the point.
There are of course substantive values that good governance reforms
might advert to: improvements to social welfare, mitigation of risk, and
the like. 3  But, as I have suggested elsewhere,8 4 as an attempt to rele-
gitimize regulatory authority, this approach falls short: not only does it
not fully defuse the fears of capture and unchecked regulatory authority,
81 See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, ICE Unbound, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2018, 7:19 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2oi8/o i/ice-is-out-of-control.html [https://perma.cc/J9S8-Z2LX].
82 See, e.g., Julian Aguilar, Trump Administration Directs Border Patrol, ICE to Expand
Deportations, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2017, ii:oo AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/21/dhs-
directs-border-patrol-ice-immediately-expand-deportation-efforts/ [https://perma.cc/8856-7 LSV]; Alan
Gomez, Trump Budget Wants Billions More for Border Wall, Immigration Agents and Judges, USA
TODAY (Feb. 13, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2 018/02/12/trump-
budget-wants-billions-more-border-wall-immigration-agents-and-judges/329766002/ [https://perma.
cc/Y6E8-TBQVI Greg Moran, ICE Looks to Private Sector to Help Hire Nearly 66oo Workers to Sup-
port the ioooo New Agents Trump Wants, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/sd-me-ice-hires-201802oi-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LLKg-4BAL].
83 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER (2013) (describing how more streamlined "nudge"
regulations can improve welfare while minimizing governmental costs and the risk of excess regu-
latory intervention); Vermeule, supra note 5, at 2464 (noting the pluralism of values animating
three major camps of administrative law theory, from presidential administration, to expertise, to
proceduralism).
84 See RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 31-53.
0696 [Vol. r31:071r
RECONSTRUCTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
it also distances itself from more thickly moral appeals to the substantive
purposes of regulation - not just in enhancing welfare, but rather in
contesting fundamental problems of power, inequality, and exclusion.
What then is a defender of equality- and inclusion-enhancing regu-
lation to do? If this account of the limits of good governance reforms is
right, then it suggests two avenues. First, it suggests that the problem
of regulatory legitimacy is not so much one of battles over regulatory
process as it is a stand-in for substantive moral debates about equality,
inclusion, and the purposes of government itself. These are controver-
sies that need to be engaged directly and explicitly through democratic
debate and contestation over the substantive moral and political goals
of public policy. Smarter regulation may well generate desirable policy
fixes but by itself cannot substitute for a direct public debate over, and
legitimation of, the thick moral goals of equality and inclusion. Second,
this account suggests that to the extent that we have real concerns about
the accountability and responsiveness of government regulators, we
need to do more than assure good governance; we need to invest in more
robust checks and balances within the administrative system itself, as
Michaels himself suggests. Indeed, perhaps paradoxically, the very sub-
stantive stakes of debates over regulatory power underscore the need for
an even more robust institutional structure to modern administrative
agencies that can address these types of concerns about agency authority
and legitimacy. Here, Michaels offers us a way forward and a language
that can help engage both critics and defenders of the modern adminis-
trative state.
III. DEMOCRATIZING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Michaels argues that part of the value of the administrative process
is that it provides a procedure and a structure through which to manage
conflicts over substantive values (p. 74). But as the previous Part sug-
gests, the substantive implications of privatization and centralization ef-
forts raise the stakes of these procedural and structural aspects of the
administrative system. The unfortunate reality is that the substantive
stakes of administrative policymaking are only likely to increase in the
future, placing the administrative process under ever-greater strain.
The result is that a defense of the administrative state will necessarily
require a thorough reimagining of the administrative process itself -
and the ways in which the administrative process relates to the larger
institutional ecology of our democracy. Administrative agencies, using
only conventional procedures, cannot bear the normative weight of the
political and policy demands increasingly placed upon them. In this,
Michaels shares some sympathy with contemporary critics of adminis-
trative authority (as do I). But rather than seeing this problem of agency
authority as a reason to eliminate or dismantle agencies altogether,
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Michaels suggests a range of interventions that would preserve the abil-
ity of agencies to meet their substantive purposes, while defusing the
real concerns about agency authority. Michaels's suggestions are valu-
able on this score, but the scale of the crisis of administration - and of
democracy - suggests the need for an even more far-reaching demo-
cratic institutional reconstruction.
A. Polarization, Gridlock, and the Growing Crisis
of Administrative Legitimacy
As a number of administrative law scholars have argued in recent
years, the realities of contemporary American politics are likely only to
increase the incentive for the Executive to exercise ever-greater policy-
making initiative through regulatory agencies. The accumulations of
decades of broad statutory delegations from Congress, combined with
growing party polarization, congressional gridlock, and public blowback
generated by legislation all create an environment where Presidents are
likely to continue to push the boundaries of substantive policymaking
through regulation.5 This is particularly true in context of divided gov-
ernment where one party controls the White House and another controls
Congress. But executive regulatory expansion is also likely in context
of unified party control of both legislature and Executive: under unified
government, Congress is even less likely to exercise its oversight function
over regulatory agencies, and the difficulties of party coordination and
legislative action make policymaking by regulation still less costly. This
shift to making more expansive public policy through regulation within
existing statutes, absent new, direct statutory authorization, raises ques-
tions about the politicization of administration, and thus the legitimacy
of the modern regulatory state, incentivizing regulators to engage
in more realpolitik rather than deliberation in making administrative
policies. 6
8 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights,
66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (noting the broad accumulation of regulatory authority, further
expanded by features like regulatory waivers and accreted de facto delegation from overlapping
statutory authorizations). On the role of agencies as primary policymakers in conditions of divided
government and congressional gridlock, see, for example, Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian E. Metzger,
Essay, Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1683
(2015); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. I (2014);
Abbe R. Gluck, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term - Comment: Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts:
Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015);
Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan
Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012); and Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies, Polarization, and the
States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2015).
86 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an "Anti-Administrativist," 131 HARV. L. REV. F.
1, 8, 10 (2017); Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
923, 969 (2016).
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The recent battles over executive power under both the waning
years of the Obama Administration and the first year of the Trump
Administration highlight these concerns in both contexts of divided and
unified government. As Republicans gained control of Congress and
effectively blocked further legislative initiatives in the later years of the
Obama Presidency, the Obama Administration pursued a number of
major initiatives through executive branch regulation, from the Clean
Power Plan aiming to address climate change through EPA regulations
of carbon dioxide,' to the significant expansion of overtime pay through
a Department of Labor (DOL) rulemaking,8 to the controversial "de-
ferred action" program granting immigration enforcement relief to un-
documented immigrant children and their parents.9 Each of these ini-
tiatives represented a substantive attempt to address structural social
and economic challenges or to expand economic equality and social in-
clusion. Each of these initiatives arose largely in context of the failure
of Congress to consider and advance draft legislation.90 Some of these
Obama Administration regulatory initiatives arguably represented a
valuable institutional experiment, deploying regulatory agencies' ability
to fuse expertise and participation to address more structural and com-
plex drivers of economic and social inequality - for example, by ad-
dressing urban segregation and housing inequality through affirmative
"equality directives" promoting fair housing.91 But each of these initia-
87 See Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, Memorandum for the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,535 (June 25, 2013) (Presidential Memorandum
calling for updating of Clean Air Act standards to address carbon dioxide emissions from power
plants); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Gen-
erating Units, So Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
88 See Presidential Memorandum of March 13, 2014; Updating and Modernizing Overtime Reg-
ulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 18,737 (Apr. 3, 2014) (Presidential Memorandum ordering DOL to "modernize
and streamline the existing overtime regulations"); Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer and Outside Sales Employees, 29 C.F.R. § 541
(2017).
89 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V Aguilar, Act-
ing Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/si -exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8BK-WZQS].
90 See sources cited supra note 85 (especially Freeman & Spence, Farina & Metzger,
McGarity, and Metzger); see also Brad Plumer, Why Has Climate Legislation Failed? An
Interview with Theda Skocpol, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://wapo.st/VKbg77?tid=ss-tw&
utm-term=.d8a74oe3o6a7 [https://perma.cc/TK4S-Y38H]; Jonathan Weisman, In Congress,
Gridlock and Harsh Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2kgGKOF
[https://perma.cc/WJ4K-6FVR].
91 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1387-92 (2012) (describing the equality-promoting effects
and institutional benefits of HUD's Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule); Olatunde
C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1794-802
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tives provoked stiff legal resistance - brought by ideological and par-
tisan opponents of these measures, but gaining sympathetic hearings
from courts skeptical about the apparent substitution of regulatory au-
thority for legislation.9 2
The incoming Trump Administration quickly reversed each of these
regulatory initiatives.9 3  For Michaels, this reversibility "is a testament
to the robustness of the administrative separation of powers and to the
pitfalls of proceeding without administrative consensus" (p. 15o). But
as Michaels argues, the tendency to make major substantive policies
through the administrative apparatus in the face of legislative gridlock
is precisely why we need to redouble our commitment to the adminis-
trative separation of powers: "[Diuring legislative impasses, more - and
more serious - federal responsibilities are routed through administra-
tive agencies" (p. I50). Michaels continues:
Where a president attempts to bypass a hostile, lumbering, or simply inde-
cisive Congress, the existence of an administrative separation of powers
stands as an especially prized safeguard - a check against unfettered
presidential power and another means of preserving and promoting multi-
polar and contentious policy formulation and implementation. Simply
stated, the administrative separation of powers ensures that when the pres-
ident channels legislative-like responsibilities into the administrative do-
main, inclusive, rivalrous, and heterogeneous governance p rdures - and
checks and balances are preserved notwithstanding the apparent circum-
vention of the constitutional separation of powers. This is true regardless
whether the president wants to ramp up or scale down federal regulatory
power. (p. Io)94
The "pathological" legislative gridlock, for Michaels, is a result of a
larger "cultural malady, a desire on the part of elected officials to no
longer work for the public good but instead to subvert the process of
governing" (p. 149). That being the case, for Michaels, the solution "lies
not in scrapping" the checks and balances of the administrative process,
but rather in "reinvigorat[ing]" them (p. 149).
(2017) (suggesting that rules like HUD's AFFH represent a novel way to address structural in-
equalities in a more nuanced, expert, and democratically participatory manner).
92 See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (granting stay against the Clean
Power Plan); Texas v. United States, 80g F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (granting preliminary injunction
against the deferred action programs), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(mem.); Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 218 E Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (granting preliminary
injunction against the DOL overtime rule).
93 See Zack Colman, Trump Administration Is Repealing Obama's Clean Power Plan, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-administration-is-repealing-
obamas-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/F7K3-P4TQ]; Sean Higgins, Trump Administration
Won't Save Obama-Era Overtime Rule, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 5, 2017, 1:24 PM),
http://washex.am/2wEzMYc [https://perma.cc/8TgP-ULNG]; Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld
Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2 xLAapv [https://perma.cc/TTJ6-2 ZTC].
94 A footnote has been omitted.
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B. Spreading and Deepening the Administrative Separation ofPowers
The use of administrative agencies to implement major new policy
initiatives is thus likely only to increase. By reinvesting in an internal
administrative separation of powers, we can help defuse these political
controversies, providing a more robust process for contestation and de-
bate within administrative agencies themselves. Furthermore, as noted
above,'9 5 there are major domains of regulatory authority that do not
comport with the checks and balances that Michaels describes, from the
welfare system to the criminal justice system. There are also major gaps
at the state and local levels in approximating similar administrative
checks and balances. This suggests the value of extending the adminis-
trative separation of powers more widely within administrative and ex-
ecutive bodies.
How then can the administrative separation of powers be expanded
and deepened? First, Michaels argues that the political branches should
act in a "custodial" capacity with respect to the administrative separa-
tion of powers (p. 68), pursuing politics that "best . . . reflect[] our dis-
tinctive admixture of populism, legalism, establishment politics (medi-
ated through the president), and bureaucratic expertise" (p. 176). Judges
are particularly important on Michaels's account as the most likely to
act custodially (p. 178). Michaels suggests that administrative law doc-
trine shift to a focus on "reinforcing rivalrous administration" (p. 18o),
offering a kind of reinvented process theory for judicial review of agency
action. Judges, on this read, should review agency decisions to ensure
they are arrived at by a sufficiently contested process that involves ad-
equate checks and balances between politically appointed agency heads,
expert agency staff, and engagement with civil society through the no-
tice-and-comment process (pp. 181-83).
Second, Michaels proposes institutional reforms to shore up in par-
ticular the independent, expert civil service on the one hand, and the
capacities of civil society to engage in the rulemaking process on the
other (p. 204). Michaels rightly worries that the independent civil ser-
vice, one of the three prongs of the administrative separation of powers,
has been "demoralized and battered" by decades of attack, villainization,
and disinvestment (p. 200). To counter this trend, Michaels's calls for
investing in personnel, salaries, and retention (pp. 205-06, 214), includ-
ing a proposal for a public service academy (pp. 209-12) and leadership
development programs (pp. 213-14), are admirable. These investments
would expand the independent expertise of "rivalrous administration."
At the same time, Michaels calls for greater popular participation in
regulation through reforms to the notice-and-comment process. In par-
ticular, he suggests reforms to make notice and comment itself more ef-
9 See supra section ILB, pp.' 6 89-g'.
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fective, for example by expanding media outreach (pp. 220-22), provid-
ing rule summaries in plain English (pp. 224-25), and allowing for
more iterative dialogue and feedback between civil society groups and
regulators (pp. 226-29).
The extensions of the administrative separation of powers Michaels
describes are tailored for the traditional suite of administrative agencies.
But they also suggest a way forward for emerging debates about the
norms and processes shaping executive discretion as well. Indeed,
we might interpret the explosive judicial blowback against the Trump
Administration's most provocative assertions of unilateral executive
power in part as a recognition of the importance of internal administra-
tive checks and balances, particularly where potentially discriminatory
conduct is at issue. From the travel ban to the ban on transgender in-
dividuals serving in the armed forces, the Trump Administration has
been slapped with swift injunctions blocking exercises of what might
otherwise be seen as purely discretionary executive power.9 6 For many
critics of the Administration, these actions represent a clash between
Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions on governmental "animus" and
Article II executive discretion.9 7 But arguably these judicial counters
are reacting as much to the apparent violations of internal administra-
tive checks and balances - evidenced by the irregularities of President
Trump's seeming lack of consultation with agency experts and bypass-
ing of ordinary executive norms of policymaking9 ' - as they are to the
substance of the executive decisions themselves. Of course, the judicial-
ization of internal procedures for executive policymaking might itself be
an encroachment on the Article II discretion of the Executive, unduly
constraining future Presidents and creating an opening for overinvasive
and subjective judicial interventionism. These dual concerns suggest a
spiraling crisis of administrative legitimacy: we distrust an expansive
executive power aggrandized through the bypassing of regular adminis-
trative order and through the use of privatization-as-workaround, but
96 See, e.g., Stone v. rump, No. MJG-1 7 -2 4 5 9, 2017 WL 5589122 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction against ban on transgender individuals serving in the military); Wash-
ington v. Trump, No. Ci 7 -oi4 iJLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting tempo-
rary restraining order against travel ban).
97 See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Affirmance at 14-17, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Thump, 857 F.3 d 554
(4 th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351); see also Joshua Matz et al., A Different View of Why the
Muslim Ban Violates the Establishment Clause, TAKE CARE (Apr. 20, 2017), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/a-different-view-of-why-the-muslim-ban-violates-the-establishment-clause
[https://perma.cc/JVX3-HARG] (summarizing Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, supra).
98 See Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/1o/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-
presidency/537921/ [https://perma.cc/Y25Y-WSFT] (describing the first travel ban as "sloppily writ-
ten, barely vetted inside the executive branch, legally overbroad, and incompetently rolled out").
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we also worry about the desirability and capacity of courts to check
these patterns. This is exactly the danger that Michaels's argument is
built to address. For Michaels, it is only through a robust administrative
separation of powers that we can create the kinds of internal checks and
balances that legitimate the exercise of administrative power - partic-
ularly in the face of deep substantive disagreements about policy goals
and outcomes (pp. 19-20). It is notable that the expansion of unitary
executive authority in the foreign service and, until recently, in the na-
tional security realm, had been marked by the informal development of
intra-executive procedures that, while perhaps still too deferential to ex-
ecutive discretion, do echo some of the administrative checks and bal-
ances celebrated by Michaels.99 A number of legal scholars are begin-
ning to grapple with the need to better institutionalize these process
norms and structures within zones of traditionally discretionary execu-
tive action, including in contexts of surveillance, national security, and
more recent concerns about threats to democratic norms themselves.100
We might think of these debates as echoing (and perhaps even extend-
ing) Michaels's concept of the administrative separation of powers
deeper into the executive branch.
C. Deepening Contestation Within the Administrative Process
But the scale of our current democratic dysfunction seems to require
a more thoroughgoing transformation of the regulatory process - and
of our broader democratic institutional contexts - than Michaels sug-
gests. This goal of assuring accountable yet effective government in the
modern era need not take the form of the separation of powers, in its
constitutional or administrative variants. But it might well require
other institutional innovations that can achieve sufficient checks and
balances to better direct and hold accountable administrative authority.
At times, Michaels seems to hew too closely to the "constitutional iso-
morphism" (p. 75) of translating the tripartite constitutional separation
of powers into a similar tripartite administrative system of political ap-
pointees, civil service experts, and civil society participation. Leverag-
ing the administrative state as a way to expand democratic capacity to
99 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2328-31 (2006) (describing internal separation
of powers within the foreign service); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, l083-84, 1117-18 (2016) (describing the approximation of ad-
ministrative law models of accountability and expertise in shaping the exercise of otherwise unitary
surveillance powers of the President).
100 See, e.g., Renan, supra note ii; Goldsmith, supra note 98 (arguing that the biggest damage
the Trump Administration has done to democracy and the executive branch has been in bypassing
norms, including intra-executive norms related to deliberation, process, and policymaking).
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contest structural inequalities and to enable checks and balances re-
quires a broader, and more flexible, approach to institutionalizing effec-
tive contestation.
For institutional checks and balances to have real force, there must
be political actors - organized civil society interests - that lie behind
those institutions and are motivated to make full use of those institu-
tions.101 This dynamic relationship between institutional structures on
the one hand, and the capacities and reach of civil society groups, social
movements, and grassroots constituencies on the other has long been a
central insight of social science studies of political contestation: policy-
making institutions are responsive not to the general public but rather
to the balance of power among organized interest groups. Indeed, much
of our concern about inequality today - and about the dangers of reg-
ulatory capture and unresponsiveness noted in Part II above - stems
from disparities of political power and influence between more sophis-
ticated and well-resourced interest groups, and other affected constitu-
encies who lack the same degree of organization and influence. Mean-
while, the capacity for civil society groups, social movements, and
constituencies on the ground to influence policymaking institutions de-
pends crucially on the ways in which these groups are able to target and
participate effectively in political institutions.1 0 2
We cannot expect the administrative process to by itself do all the
moral and political work of catalyzing, sustaining, channeling, and
ultimately legitimizing political contestation and policy outcomes. At
some point, we have to look to our broader democratic ecosystem to
address and defuse the kinds of pitched substantive battles and power
disparities afflicting the administrative state today. Put another way, at
some point, we will have to address the larger crisis of democratic dys-
function in twenty-first-century American politics for the administrative
process - even a radically democratized and rivalrous one - to work.
101 This is a key argument advanced recently by Professor Daryl Levinson, pointing out that the
checks and balances sought by constitutional designs such as the separation of powers and federal-
ism rest on a relationship between institutions and configurations of power among social groups.
See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 20I5 Term - Foreword: Looking for Power in Public
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 36, 40, 84 (2016).
102 Professor Kate Andrias makes a similar critique in her response to Levinson's article. See
Kate Andrias, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. I, 5-6 (2016); see also Kate
Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 419 (2015). For examples of social science's focus on organized interests and the inter-
actions between movements and institutions, see generally HACKER & PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-
ALL POLITICS, supra note 74; SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT (1994); and CHARLES
TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 2009). For a larger discussion of
this problem of power, participation, and administrative institutional design, see, for example, RAH-
MAN, supra note 16, at 139-65; and Rahman, supra note 16.
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Viewed in this broader context of democratic reconstruction, the admin-
istrative process itself might need to undergo an even more radical
transformation.
i. Expanding Civic Power Through Democratic, Participatory Reg-
ulation. - Michaels acknowledges the importance of the ecosystems of
civil society actors, from NGOs to advocacy groups to regulated indus-
tries - what he terms the "thick political surround" (p. 61).103 But
Michaels is somewhat skeptical of such efforts to expand interest group
representation and pluralism within the administrative process as po-
tentially "too chaotic to serve as a framework for governing" (p. 162).
Michaels warns that it will be difficult to determine which groups
should be represented, and these efforts invite a "free-for-all" that might
threaten the rule of law itself (p. 162). While these concerns are well
taken, it is not clear that the challenges of designing and implementing
a broadly inclusive form of stakeholder representation within the regu-
latory state are any more or less difficult than the kind of contestatory
process review that Michaels (rightly) seeks to promote. Furthermore,
the escalation of political conflict around the administrative state noted
above suggests that as the focus on the stakes of regulation grows, bu-
reaucratic politics are already succumbing to exactly these dangers of
corrosive conflict, and that creating institutions that engage but struc-
ture such political conflict would help defuse and regularize it. Indeed,
this is precisely the Madisonian move, to recognize yet channel political
conflict through institutional design.
The kinds of balanced participation and influence needed to have
robust checks and balances flowing through the administrative (and
constitutional) separation of powers depend on a background context of
effective civil society and grassroots organizing. But organizing indi-
viduals into communities capable of political engagement is costly. It
takes financial resources, organizing strategy, and the long-term cultiva-
tion of membership and grassroots leaders.1 0 4 The erosion of organized
labor is only one aspect of the much broader decades-long decline of
mass member community organizing groups.1 0 5 Without a revitalization
of this kind of civil society, it is hard to see how the disparities of political
lo3 See also Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence,
126 YALE L.J. 346, 391-407 (2016) (describing the "thick political surround of actors both external
and internal to the three branches," id. at 391).
104 See generally HAHRIE HAN, How ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOP ACTIVISTS (2014) (cata-
loguing various forms and models of activism and assessing their ability to inspire political action);
THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY (2003) (describing the changing nature of civic
engagement in the United States and the rise of professional advocacy organizations); TARROW,
supra note 102.
1os See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 104.
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power and influence can be remedied - or how our substantive con-
flicts and disagreements in a polarized climate can be addressed. 106
Such civil society organizing is itself made more effective and likely
in context of institutional reforms that provide "hooks and levers" for
stakeholder groups to plug in and to advocate for their views in a struc-
tured manner.1 0 7  This kind of contestation requires more than notice
and comment. Two avenues for reform in particular stand out.
First, we could imagine more direct forms of inclusive representation
within administrative bodies. Despite Michaels's concerns on this score,
there are a wide range of on-the-ground experiments in such systems at
both the federal and local levels that suggest some routes forward.o10  At
the local level, cities and states are experimenting with wage boards that
oversee labor protections and that are composed of representatives from
labor as well as business.10 9 Local economic development oversight
commissions formed in Oakland and spreading elsewhere empower
community representatives alongside developers to assure the imple-
mentation of city development projects.110 There is already widespread
use of advisory groups and stakeholder representatives throughout the
federal regulatory state.' Scholars have often proposed regulatory
bodies that institutionalize "proxy advocacy"112 or "regulatory public de-
fenders"13 or "Offices of Goodness"1 14 to make this kind of countervail-
ing power more possible and influential.1 1 5
106 On the importance of association in democratic life, see, for example, NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS (1998).
107 For a sketch of this broader argument on the relationship between community organizing and
institutional structures and esign, see, for example, HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN & K. SABEEL
RAHMAN, BUILDING CIVIC CAPACITY IN AN ERA OF DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 3, 8-17 (2017),
https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/BuildingCivicCapacity-in-anEra-of
DemocraticCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/SgX4-FB6E].
108 For an expanded discussion of this point, see Rahman, supra note 16. Indeed, state and local
administrative regimes are often overlooked as spaces for institutional innovation.
109 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 66, 85-87 (2016).
110 See Rahman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 35-36).
III See K. Sabeel Rahman, Note, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy,
and Institutional Experimentation in the 20o Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 555, 574-80 (2011) (describing examples of federal regulatory interest representation
through advisory committees, codified in Dodd-Frank and proposed in other statutes).
112 Daniel Schwarz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Ev-
idence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 53, at
365, 389-91 (examining case studies of how proxy advocacy and tripartism have helped mitigate
the risk of capture in state-level insurance regulation).
113 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 491
(2005).
114 Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 60-62 (2014).
115 For a classic articulation of the value - but also challenges - of greater interest representa-
tion in the administrative state, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). In the 199os, scholars suggested a modified approach of
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Second, policy design can also create more footholds for affected
constituencies to engage more directly, sharing in the exercise of
regulatory power and providing more direct checks and balances
through the monitoring and enforcement process itself. Where regula-
tory agencies set substantive standards, participatory and grassroots
monitoring can help hold both regulators and private actors accounta-
ble, providing a valuable form of leverage for civil society groups. This
approach of "citizen audits" shaped the enforcement of the federal
Community Reinvestment Act rules to promote greater lending in mi-
nority neighborhoods, and it has been deployed in a variety of other
urban and global contexts.1 1 6 These kinds of experiments suggest the
potential for more involved institutional reforms that do more than
simply optimize notice and comment; instead, these measures are valu-
able insofar as they actively foster and encourage greater countervailing
power, especially among those constituencies that are otherwise margin-
alized or displaced from exercising political influence relative to more
sophisticated and well-resourced advocacy interests.
2. Greater Contestation Through Revived Traditional Democratic
Institutions. - There is real debate over how much Michaels's rival-
rous administration can do to legitimate the regulatory state and bear
the load of substantive political disputes taking place in context of an
increasingly unequal and tainted electoral and legislative process. The
democratization of administration thus cannot be pursued in isolation
from a broader attempt at democratic institutional revival. By expand-
ing the capacities of core democratic institutions, from Congress to states
and cities, we could better enable our political process to directly engage
in substantive debate and to assert checks and balances through political
institutions, rather than funneling these debates through the adminis-
trative process.
First, even in a world of expanded administrative power and robust
rivalrous administrative processes, the legitimacy and efficacy of regu-
lation depends in part on the background existence of a well-functioning
legislature that can authorize and oversee regulatory agencies, bearing
political responsibility for more controversial and high-stakes substan-
tive policy developments. To some degree this concern about legislative
"collaborative governance" that would enhance stakeholder participation and representation while
also assuring effective and streamlined governance. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 324-25 (1998); Jody Free-
man, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. I, 2 7-28 (1997). I
am sympathetic to these collaborative governance accounts, but have suggested that they need to
take greater account of disparities of power that can undermine efforts at engaging a wider range
of stakeholders. See RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 97-115.
116 Rahman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 55-57); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, From Civic Tech
to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, POL. SCI. & POL. 751, 755-56 (2017).
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oversight has laced throughout critiques of the regulatory state, stretch-
ing from the early days of the nondelegation doctrine and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,1 1 7 to more contemporary calls
for Congress to reassert its primacy as the central seat of democratic
sovereignty and legislative authority, particularly in its oversight capac-
ities with respect to the regulatory state." Crucially, achieving a better
division of labor between legislature and administration requires more
than exhortations to Congress; it also requires a very real restoration of
investment in Congress's core competencies and capacities, from policy
analysis to legislative staff to oversight hearings.1 19
Second, administrative legitimacy also rests on a background pre-
sumption of a well-functioning electoral democracy. But in an era of
growing concerns over voter suppression and gerrymandered districts,
electoral responsiveness i limited, contributing to the decline of con-
gressional responsiveness as well. 1 2 0  Campaign finance reforms, fair
districting, and the restoration of broad access to the franchise are thus
essential for restoring the electoral system's ability to channel and ad-
dress substantive political conflict. If these core legislative and electoral
systems are themselves tainted or blocked, the realities of substantive
conflict over economic and social issues fall increasingly on regulatory
agencies, which cannot bear the normative and political weight of re-
solving these disputes on their own.
Third, while Michaels adapts the Madisonian separation of powers
for the administrative context, one might imagine a similar adapting of
the other structure for checks and balances in the Madisonian system:
117 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
118 For a classic account of this concern, see generally, for example, DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993). More recently, several scholars have offered power-
ful arguments to revisit the foundational powers of Congress in overseeing and managing the mod-
ern administrative state and the executive branch more generally. See generally, e.g., JOSH
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS (2017); Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress's Role in the Modern Administrative
State, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (reviewing Chafetz's book and summarizing the ar-
gument for expanded legislative oversight of regulation).
119 On the problem of Congress's declining capacity, see Lee Drutman, Congress Should Do Its
Job. But the Job Members Can Do Depends on the Resources They Have., Vox: POLYARCHY (Feb.
15, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2o17/2/15/14623588/congress-underresourced
[https://perma.cc/KNK4-482J]; Lee Drutman, If Congress Is Truly Going to Check Executive Power,
It Needs to Allocate More Money for Staff, Vox: POLYARCHY (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:50 PM), https://
www.vox.com/polyarchy/2o-6/1-2/15/13971320/congress-executive-power-check [https://perma.cc/
8MMD-NGSB]; and Lee Drutman, These Frightening New Survey Results Describe a Congress in
Crisis, Vox: POLYARCHY (Aug. 8, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2o17/
8/8/i 6112574/cmf-congress-survey-crisis [https://perma.cc/TgB8-YNVH]. On proposals for how
Congress can assert greater authority and oversight, see, for example, CHAFETZ, supra note I8.
120 See, e.g., Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People ofPolitical Power,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 9, 2016), http://wapo.st/isxqpYE [https://perma.cc/X4UW-
UWNS].
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the vertical, rather than horizontal, division of labor through federalism
and decentralization. Indeed, scholars of federalism and localism have
often suggested the value of decentralization in facilitating greater voice,
participation, representation, and ultimately accountability.1 2 1 Decen-
tralization not only diffuses governmental power; it also makes possible
more direct forms of participation by stakeholders and constituencies
more capable of engaging effectively at a local rather than national level.
The practice of "dissenting by deciding" provides a more active and pro-
ductive form of dissent and contestation.12 2 It enables constituencies to
actually claim a share of governmental power and forces them to de-
velop and implement actual policies, rather than simply asserting oppo-
sition.1 23 Furthermore, as a number of scholars have recently suggested,
the interaction between federalism and decentralization on the one hand
and the dynamics of regulatory policymaking and enforcement on the
other has often been a central dynamic of the modern administrative
state, allowing for experimentation and the ability of social movements
to engage and pressure regulators.1 24 This regulatory federalism is not
without its risks (particularly in permitting local resistance to regulatory
initiatives), but it suggests the tantalizing possibility of a parallel argu-
ment to that of Michaels: the institutionalization of Madisonian federal-
ism all the way forward just as Michaels calls for the extension of the
Madisonian separation of powers "all the way forward" (p. 159).
IV. THE CRISIS OF ADMINISTRATION
AS A CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY
Michaels's book is titled Constitutional Coup, and the title evokes
the deep constitutional stakes of Michaels's argument. The book largely
centers the structural constitution, adapting the separation of powers
concepts to argue for the importance of checks and balances in the ad-
ministrative state. This approach allows Michaels to put in the same
frame the seemingly opposite but very much related threats of privati-
zation on the one hand and centralization on the other, analyzing both
as sharing a common danger of bypassing institutional checks and bal-
ances and effectively aggrandizing unchecked arbitrary power. It is a
great virtue of Michaels's account that it can address both of these in-
verse and related problems of privatization and centralization, showing
121 See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 76, at 8-13; RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER 255-58
(2016); David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y
REV. I, 1-2 (2009).
122 See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1750-51 (2005).
123 Id.
124 See KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY 12-14 (2016); Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-




why a single-minded focus on executive efficiency and a dislike of pro-
cedural frictions is misguided. This framing also allows Michaels to
place the stakes of regulatory reform at an appropriately weighty level:
the goal is not merely better governance, but rather the most central
constitutional values of effective yet nonarbitrary government.
But the stakes are much higher even than this. Viewed in light of its
substantive valence, the problem of anti-administrativism and the af-
firmative defense of administration takes on a different light. Structural
checks and balances matter not just to legitimize the exercise of govern-
mental authority, but to make it possible for administrative authority to
address substantive challenges of economic and social inequity. The
administrative state, then, becomes a central catalyst for democracy in
both of these senses: providing the policy tools and spaces through which
we the people can collectively address problems of structural economic
inequalities or social exclusions, and providing a process through which
we can design and implement these policies through democratic partic-
ipation and checks and balances. Michaels's account, I would argue,
conveys more than a defense of the administrative process. It is, at its
heart, a defense of the idea of democracy itself, in both its procedural
and substantive dimensions.
Indeed, Michaels uses the language of "public" and "private"
throughout, but the import of these terms is greater than might be read-
ily apparent. By "public," Michaels connotes omething more than just
"that which is done by the state." Indeed, the concept of the "public" in
Michaels's work operates as a normative concept, connoting a sense of
democratic accountability. "Private," by contrast, is troubling for
Michaels not just because it is the province of business, of markets, and
of profit motives, but more broadly because these features of "the pri-
vate" make it a very different system of collective decisionmaking that
lacks the normative values and features of democracy - and of consti-
tutionalism (p. 4). By invoking the idea of the "public," Michaels seems
to be deploying two distinct but related arguments: First, that substan-
tive disagreements and battles over social and economic issues need to
be brought into the realm of public debate, public politics, and public
policy - they cannot be addressed and defused solely by market mech-
anisms or private ordering. Second, the way in which we address these
public political debates requires a form of structured contestation: true
to the Madisonian core of the separation of powers, we design public
institutions both to catalyze and draw in substantive debates and to
structure those debates productively so as to limit concentration of ar-
bitrary authority and enable some degree of collective problem-solving.
At issue, then, is not just the principle of effective but limited govern-
ment; the survival of the administrative state is also central to even
making possible the tools through which we counteract background
structures and systems of economic and social inequality and exclusion.
The processes structuring administrative governance help assure us that
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these coercive tools of the state are in fact deployed toward publicly
legitimate - and contestable, and nonarbitrary - ends.
Now for some readers, this emphasis on the substantive import of
the administrative state may seem maddeningly counterproductive: by
bypassing a procedurally neutral defense of administration, the argu-
ments above might well give away the most valuable source of admin-
istrative legitimacy. Perhaps. But to say this is, I think, to misunder-
stand the politics of the current moment. The administrative state is
not neutral, either in its origins or in how it is viewed in today's political
environment. If it were seen as neutral, it wouldn't be facing this kind
of existential threat from its critics - and that threat would not be so
selectively applied to dismantle some agencies while expanding the au-
thority of others. Rather, administration is necessarily mission and pur-
pose driven. And crucially, these purposes need not map on to partisan
differences. Environmental protection, for example, has for much of the
history of the EPA until recently been seen as a value for both conserva-
tives and liberals, with meaningful policy disagreements worked out
through different applications of EPA authority.12 5 But once a faction
of organized interests shifts to reject the core purpose of regulation itself,
then dismantling, rather than simply redirecting, administrative author-
ity and administrative checks and balances becomes preferred as a pol-
icy agenda. Indeed, the high politics of anti-administrativism represent
a real and legitimate critique of administrative authority - and one that
can be debated in good faith. But on its own, these high politics of anti-
administrativism are simply not politically powerful enough to explain
the extremes of today's political realities. The politics of organized eco-
nomic elites and racial resentment, however, are. And these are political
forces that are much more difficult to debate and overcome.
This existential challenge to the modern state is not new. Arguably,
the blowback against Reconstruction took a similar form, as Southern
"Redemption" sought, violently, to reclaim the apparatus of state
power and dismantle the aspirations and institutional tools of Radical
Reconstruction.1 2 6 The business lobby opposing the New Deal similarly
sought to dismantle its foundational institutions.1 27  If we are in the
midst of a "Third Reconstruction" seeking to finally make good on the
aspirations for economic, racial, and gender inclusion after the ups and
downs of the twentieth century, the administrative state will be a critical
125 See, e.g., Christopher Sellers, How Republicans Came to Embrace Anti-Environmentalism, Vox
(June 7, 2017, 8:'9 AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/4/22/15377964/republicans-environmentalism
[https://perma.cc/HNMg-2BNL] (noting that President Nixon "created the Environmental
Protection Agency and signed many foundational laws").
126 See, e.g., CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 173-203 (2007); James Gray Pope,
Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? Law and the Racial Divide in the American
Working Class, 1676-1964, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1568-89 (2016).
127 HACKER & PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA, supra note 74, at 180-237; PHILLIPS-FEIN,
supra note 74, at 19-23.
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institutional source of power and policymaking. The "constitutional
coup" that privatization and centralization alike pose, then, is to more
than the structural values that Michaels emphasizes; it is also a threat
to the substantive aspirations to redeem our highest constitutional val-
ues of equality, liberty, and democracy. Realizing both the substantive
and procedural dimensions of our constitutional values and aspirations
thus requires not the deconstruction, but rather the reconstruction of the
administrative state, providing a more robust process of checks and bal-
ances through which these substantive debates can be engaged - while
preserving the instrumentalities of regulation through which we tackle
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